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The theme of this article is that for reasons related more closely to politic incentives 
rather than fiscal reality there is a tendency among some policy makers to make wrong 
choices in attempting to manage fiscal stress and crisis, preferring to use more easily 
negotiated "quick fixes" such as across-the-board cuts in spending for programs that do 
not contribute much to deficits and debt. In fact such cutting usually makes the fiscal 
situation worse rather than better because they reduce economic growth in the private 
sector needed to pull out of debt and economic recession (Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis, 2012). Typically, such budget reductions result in increased unemployment as 
public sector jobs are cut, further reducing revenues to government while increasing 
unemployment insurance cost of government. Fiscal stress is defined as when revenues 
fall short of expenses but a government or other public entity in debt remains able to 
obtain loans to finance current operations and debt restructuring, albeit at increasingly 
higher level of interest while they participate in some form of debt restructuring. Fiscal 
crisis occurs when governments no longer can get loans and are not able to sell their 
debt in financial markets at any price. This article examines US fiscal stress conditions 
and management approaches and then compares the US experience to that of the Euro-
pean Union and the Eurozone. It explains that while there is genuine need for changes 
in fiscal policy, such changes should be proposed, analyzed thoroughly, negotiated and 
implemented carefully over time rather than yielding to political expedience using debt 
panic as a means of forcing the adoption of quick but unworkable approaches to resolu-
tion of the real problems that cause both short and longer-term fiscal stress. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In analyzing the recent circumstance of international financial stress we have come to 
understand that the initiatives implemented by governments in the US, Europe and 
elsewhere, although different in many respects, are both macroeconomic and microeco-
nomic in nature. For example, the financial bailout and stimulus "rescue" plans underta-
ken in the US and in some other nations have involved a combination of monetary and 
fiscal policy. Looking back more that three years ago in the US experience the appro-
ximately $700 billion Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) authorization passed by 
the US Congress in October, 2008 and the economic stimulus and recovery legislation 
(The Emergency Economic Recovery Act) passed by Congress and signed by President 
Obama in February 2009 were accompanied by actions of the Federal Reserve Bank to 
hold interest rates low and to push money into the economy. Both monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments continue to be used, managed by the US Treasury and Federal Re-
serve Bank under the support of Congress and the President. These and other economic 
stimulus actions have increased the annual US deficit and total debt. The tradeoff for 
increased debt is assistance in stimulating the US economy into moderate recovery from 
recession in 2011 and into 2012 as GDP rose at an annual rate of approximately 2% 
during this period. 
U. S. FISCAL POLICY CHALLENGES 
With respect to fiscal policy, annual budget deficits have resulted in the growth of debt 
as a percentage of GDP in the US and elsewhere. The $1.3 trillion annual deficit in 
2008 at the end of the Bush administration represented 9.3% of the US GDP. The fiscal 
year deficit for 2012 is projected in the FY 2013 President's Budget to be 8.5% but this 
number is what many believe to be an overly optimistic projection by the President's 
Office of Management and Budget. The annual budget deficit level as a percentage of 
GDP projected for FY 2012 may be compared to FY 2004 when it was 3.6 percent, or to 
1983 for example when it was 6 percent of GDP. The President's budget proposal pre-
sented to Congress in February 2012 continues a four year trend of the largest US annu-
al budget deficits as a percentage of GDP since World War II. This trend line is a result 
of the costs of multiple financial "bailout" and "rescue" authorization and appropriation 
legislation passed by Congress and signed into law by the President as noted above. 
Also adding to the deficit were costs incurred for other financial stress related legisla-
tion enacted between 2009 and 2012, e.g., to stimulate employment, cut the pace of 
housing foreclosures and to stimulate the recovery of housing and other industries. Fur-
ther government economic stimulus measures already passed or now under considera-
tion in the US Congress, including the recently approved extension of Bush era tax cuts 
until the end of 2012, will reduce tax revenues to the federal government. 
The trend of increasing debt as a percentage of GDP and the necessity to pay off Treas-
ury debt as it comes due (debt service) is projected to continue as a result of efforts to 
counter the lasting effects of the 2008-2011 economic recession. Any new stimulus ini-
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tiatives, added to the continuously rising costs of providing health care and income sup-
port to an aging population, will add more to a cumulative US debt that will be some-
where between $16.2 to $16.4 trillion before the end of 2012. 
A sizable portion of US debt is owed to foreign investors including two major purchas-
ers, China and Japan. As of the beginning of 2011 foreign investors held 47% of US 
debt compared to 5% in 1970 and 19% in 1990 (OMB, 2011). Of this amount China 
held $884 billion or 5.9% and Japan $862 or 5.7% billion of the total debt of $15 trillion 
(CRS, 2011). Since that time both the total debt and ownership by China have in-
creased; total debt as of March 2012 is nearly $16 trillion and China's percentage of this 
is nearly 8%. Public fears about foreign debt ownership are thus somewhat unfounded 
for several reasons. Japan, a close US ally, holds almost as much US debt as China. 
Secondly, for reasons related to the amount of dollars these nations hold, neither wants 
to see the US dollar devalued. Thirdly, both of these nations want and need to sell their 
products in the huge US market. Thus, both China and Japan have a strong interest in 
the status of the US economy as it emerges from recession. Further, presently the US is 
able to sell its debt at relatively low rates, e.g., about 2%. This reduces somewhat the 
burden of repaying the debt in the future. All of the above supports the primary theme 
of this article that there is no financial reason for debt panic in the US given current low 
interest rates, low rate of inflation and positive GDP growth. 
Both elected officials in Washington, D. C. and the American public have become much 
more aware of the fact that US federal government annual budget deficits and total debt 
have increased substantially and are going to increase further in the near future until 
solutions are devised to address projected shortfalls in financing for costly entitlement 
programs including Medicare and Medicaid. While the President's Fiscal Year 2013 
budget request to Congress (OMB, 2012) proposes to cut the size of the annual budget 
deficit for 2013 down to $901 billion or 5.5% of GDP (down from $1327 billion in 
2012 and 8.5% of GDP), this does little to ease worries about the increasing size of the 
total debt and corresponding growth of entitlement program obligations, added to exist-
ing public concern about job creation, the state of the economy, the health of the na-
tion's schools, the human and financial costs of war, the survival of federal government 
pension systems and their ability to meet legally required obligations and so on. Still, 
looking further out, if adopted by Congress as proposed the President's budget (which 
almost never occurs) projects reduction of total annual deficits as a percentage of GDP 
to 3.9% in 2014, and 2.7% by FY 2018. We must observe as have others that the num-
bers in the President's budget are susceptible to "cooking" to some extent by his budget 
office, OMB. If we look at the projections of the Congressional Budget Office that has 
to serve members of Congress from both political parties we find the following among 
the many and somewhat confusing deficit and debt projections provided by this agency 
in estimating the results from analysis of the President's FY 2013 budget (CBO, 2012): 
total debt at approximately 9% of GDP for FY 2012 and annual deficits averaging 5.4% 
for the period 2013-2022. However, beyond the projections of annual deficit percent-
ages of GDP are estimates by CBO of the size of the total debt of the US federal gov-
ernment as a percentage of GDP. 
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Figure 1 does not reveal any problem. It shows what is known as the "baseline" i.e., 
what would result if spending and programs remained at current levels, which it won't 
as explained subsequently in this article. The more disconcerting data are shown in Fig-
ure 2; what will happen if Congress and future Presidents do not change current spend-
ing policies: total debt percentages will rise from approximately 69% of GDP in 2011 to 
87% in 2020 and 146% by 2030. After this date the projection are too far out in the fu-
ture to be considered reliable, in part because they show debt levels that literally could 
not be bourn by the US government or by taxpayers. 
What is clear from these projections is that while there is no reason for debt panic pres-
ently, demographics will increase entitlement spending to unprecedented and unsustain-
able levels unless changes are made in the fiscal policies that drive up costs in these 
politically sensitive trust funds. Based on the history of US fiscal policy and the perfor-
mance of elected officials in the past since the beginning of the nation (Jones and 
McCaffery, 1979; McCaffery and Jones, 2001) it is fair to assume that at some point the 
changes needed will be made but, perhaps not until actual fiscal crisis is very near. The 
political impact of this, when it occurs, is difficult to predict because of the conflicting 
preferences of the US public. On one hand people want a fiscally responsible govern-
ment. On the other, they don't want changes in any programs that affect them. 
Figure 1: CBO Baseline Projections; No Real Problems in Sight 
 
Source: CBO, 2011. CBO defines the baseline as follows: "Each January CBO prepares 'baseline' budget 
projections spanning the next 10 years. Those projections are not a forecast of future events; rather, they 
are intended to provide a benchmark against which potential policy changes can be measured. Therefore, 
as specified in law, those projections generally incorporate the assumption that current laws are imple-
mented" (CBO, 2012a: 1). 
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 Figure 2: Federal total debt as a percentage of GDP 1990-2080 - Very Real Problems 
in Sight 
 
With respect to the data shown in Figure 2 it must be noted that other nations have lev-
els of debt as high as what the worst projections show for the US if policies aren't 
changed. For example, Japan currently has a debt that is about 235% of GDP; Italy 
about 118% of GDP (See Figure 3 below). However, in Figure 3 we see the total debt of 
nations that includes state and local government debt. For this reason the US percentage 
is shown in this display at about 100% of GDP. The point is that from a US taxpayers' 
point of view, or the views of taxpayers in other nations, all of the debt shown, whether 
federal or not, has to be repaid primarily from the same sources, i.e., individual citizens 
and corporations. However, once again the data also support the point of this article that 
there is no reason for debt panic presently other than for use as a political scare tactic. 
More will be noted on this dynamic subsequently in this article. 
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Figure 3: Total Public Debt as a Percentage of GDP in Developed Nations in 2011 
 
Source: CRS, 2012. 
It is fact that increased transparency and media attention, some might say obsession, in 
an election year about government budgeting and finance has led to heightened interest 
in how government spends and proposes to spend taxpayer and borrowed money, and 
whether the amount of debt owed is healthy for the US economy. While the US econo-
my grew at an annual average rate of about 3% in 2011, significantly increased oil and 
gasoline prices beginning in February 2012, along with continued relatively high unem-
ployment and underemployment should worry the citizenry. A burst of inflation could 
lead to Federal Reserve Bank and commercial bank interest rate hikes, higher borrowing 
costs for the US government, increases in prices of goods generally throughout the 
economy and other "bad things" that could retard economic recovery and stifle econom-
ic growth. The last thing any treasury secretary or finance minister in any nation wants 
to confront is the deadly dragon of stagflation. 
The response among the public to greater political and media concentration on the 
"poor" state of the economy is the addition of even more fear to what is already highly 
distressing about the potentially dire consequences of what a government that is already 
held in very low esteem might decide to do with respect to fiscal policy. This is espe-
cially evident when considered in the context of a highly divided and politicized debate 
over the direction of the nation the often features seriously misguided proposals about 
how to confront and manage fiscal stress. Combined with the fact of continuing high 
unemployment it is no wonder that sample polls of US citizen satisfaction with Con-
gress and the federal government reflect continuing consternation and frustration about 
the present and future ability of government to address the serious long-term issues that 
could weaken the US economy. 
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Amidst this climate of fear let us dig further into the details of fiscal policy. As most of 
us are aware, when the deficit goes up the opportunity cost for paying for increased debt 
service sometime result in cuts in federal government programs, especially in the discre-
tionary part of annual spending, e.g., social programs and national defense. The discre-
tionary portion of annual US federal government spending (for domestic programs and 
national defense) represents only 32% of total spending, with 68% spent in support of 
federal entitlement programs including Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, i.e., 
programs and trust funds that are difficult to cut or even hold in check as demographics 
and rising health care costs "automatically" drive up spending. Given this understanding 
the implications and potential consequences of high debt over the long-term become 
clearer. Unless political decision makers change the course of current policies, total debt 
will rise and both discretionary and entitlement programs will face greater budget reduc-
tion pressure in the coming years. Further, because the US finds itself in the position of 
fighting a long and expensive war and the fact that the Bush and Obama administrations 
already have cut social program spending significantly, a longer term trend that began 
under the Reagan administration in the 1980s, finding ways to reduce spending just in 
the discretionary budget that are agreeable to both Congress and the President will be 
even more difficult. Thus, the financial rescue plans already implemented in the US, in 
European and other nations that involve increased debt have serious longer term conse-
quences. 
Part of the debate over the use of government debt to finance the bailout of the troubled 
US banking systems in the wake of the sub-prime housing mortgage market collapse in 
the US in 2008 which affected many non-US banks and foreign treasuries that had in-
vested in US mortgage financing and associated (risky) derivatives, centers on the ques-
tion of how deeply governments should intervene financially to save private sector insti-
tutions. In the US such government investments have included absorption of the debt of 
two huge federally guaranteed home lending institutions (Fannie May and Freddy Mac), 
purchase of equity in numerous private banks, funding to support the US automobile 
industry, and outright purchase of private firms such as the AIG insurance corporation. 
Finding answers to the questions of who to bailout, when and why in devising ap-
proaches to stabilize the economy are among the significant unanswered issues that will 
inevitably be faced by future Presidents of the United States and Congress. The US is 
not alone in having to devise ways to finance and manage monetary, fiscal and econom-
ic stress as similar challenges confronted the leaders of governments and national and 
private banking institutions around the world. 
DEBT PANIC 
A critical point needs to be made about how to define and differentiate between fiscal 
stress and fiscal crisis, and as a result to be able to determine whether the US and other 
nations are in an economic and fiscal "crisis" or a fiscal "stress" condition presently. 
While for political reasons it is understandable why elected officials, including Presi-
dent Obama, sometimes use the word "crisis" to characterize the current situation, i.e., 
to persuade others such as members of Congress to act in response. However, scholars 
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who conduct research on financial stress and crisis in governments from the period of 
the 1830s and before to the present point out that a crisis really only occurs when gov-
ernments can no longer get loans to finance current operations and proposed invest-
ments. Such is not the case for the US presently. 
In part due to genuine concerns over the projected effects of a continuing large total US 
debt position and, consequently, the solvency of the US government over the next ten to 
forty years, and in part because of the dynamics of election year politics, concerns have 
been raised about fiscal policy that have been reported continuously and at high profile 
in the media. The resulting response among politicians and the much of the public may 
be characterized as "debt panic". Debt panic has been raised intentionally, as a political 
tactic of the Party out of power, and unintentionally as the result of the rising costs of 
Social Security and federal health care spending. Debt panic has been applied by mem-
bers of the Republican party in attempt to gain leverage against President Obama and 
the Democratic party; but this is simply politics as usual, especially in an election year. 
What is of concern is that virtually all of the fiscal policy (taxing and spending) efforts 
of the Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives, thus far have focused on 
the need to cut the discretionary part of federal government spending with little atten-
tion to the real problems pushing the debt higher each day that result from spending on 
entitlements. In attempt to show that Congress was trying to take action on the debt, in 
the process of raising the total debt limit ceiling that must be stipulated in law, it passed 
what is now referred to as the "Budget Control Act" (PL 112-25) in early August 2011 
that set a ceiling for the Fiscal Year 2013 discretionary budget of $1.028 billion. This 
targeted national defense and domestic programs for approximately a 10% reduction but 
did nothing to control entitlement spending. This reinforced alarm because seasoned 
observers of fiscal policy have known for at least the past decade and in some cases for 
a number of decades that the real debt problem is caused by the rapid pace of growth of 
entitlement program spending not affected by this Act. 
I have two reactions to the misperception and misrepresentation of debt panic. First, it is 
dishonest. Anyone who says that the US can reduce its debt substantially by cutting 
discretionary programs comprising roughly 32% of total federal spending is misrepre-
senting the facts - period. In truth, federal spending on politically and socially sensitive 
entitlement programs including Social Security and very large health care financial as-
sistance programs has to be reduced or, at minimum, rates of growth must be curtailed. 
Resolving the Social Security issue should not be a problem. Solutions are so simple 
that one wonders why this hasn't been done already. As was accomplished by Congress 
and the Reagan administration in 1983, the solvency of this program can be restored by 
raising the age at which people become eligible to receive benefits and raising the So-
cial Security (FICA) taxes paid by working Americans and their employers. No need for 
panic here. 
The second aspect of "debt panic" that bothers me is that by international standards tax-
payers in the US pay dramatically less for Social Security than do taxpayers for similar 
or even more lucrative social support (safety net) programs in most of the rest of the 
world. Cutting spending on health care is a much more complex and difficult task and 
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accordingly it is likely that it will take Congress and Presidents years to work out reso-
lutions to this problem. 
The central thesis of this article is there is way too much that is stressed about related to 
the federal government debt and the state of the economy in the US presently than is 
warranted. Much of this concern will fade, for better or worse, after the general elec-
tions are over in November of this year. More importantly, the US has faced similar 
debt problems in the past, e.g., after the Revolutionary war, not just in the 1930s but in 
the 1830s (Roberts, 2012; see also Roberts, 2010), in the post-Civil war period, in 1987 
when the stock market "collapsed", in the early 1990s and 2000s and at many other 
times (McCaffery and Jones, 2001). The solution has usually come from increased pro-
duction and productivity in the private sector that results in higher tax revenues which 
reduce annual deficits and, potentially, total debt, e.g., as a result of the information 
technology driven economic stimulation in the 1990s that led to four straight years of 
balanced annual US budgets. Additionally, as noted, the US's debt position is not as 
high as it is portrayed relative to that of some of the other nations in the developed 
world. 
We must acknowledge that fiscally and politically federal government spending is very 
difficult to cut. Part of the problem is that most Americans want all kinds of services 
provided by governments at various levels but we don't want to pay for them. From an 
economics point of view, don't we all want to be "free riders"? Isn't this economically 
and psychologically rational? The answer is resoundingly "yes" but eventually the piper 
must be paid. The grasshopper must emulate the ant. Spending must be curtailed but in 
the right areas, taxes must be raised, saving must increase, sound investments must be 
made, the foibles of easy credit and the financial system excesses that led to the collapse 
of 2008 must be avoided, and the economy, which is the key, must recover and thrive. 
The third aspect of debt panic relates to my first concern, i.e., that rapid and drastic cuts 
in government spending and employment are not in any way a wise or even viable way 
of resolving long-term debt and solvency problems. Cutting government spending rap-
idly whether it be on social programs, education, national defense or whatever else, re-
sults in just the opposite effects that proponents of this approach claim. Here we have a 
dreadful recent example to support this point. 
Under Prime Minister David Cameron the UK government did exactly what I have indi-
cated is unwise policy: government budgets and employees were slashed very rapidly 
without much or any concern for the consequences of these reductions on the many cli-
entele groups affected. However, Cameron either didn't know or chose to ignore the 
advice of numerous domestic and international economists who warned of the larger 
economic impact effects of deep and dramatic budget and service cuts. And quite obvi-
ously he ignored evidence from the history of management of fiscal stress (Oborne, 
2012). The result of what may be characterized as "Cameron's folly" is that GDP for the 
UK in 2012 is projected at about zero. In fact, it could be negative. What about 2013? 
The answer is about the same: zero for 2012 and a perhaps only a very small increase in 
GDP in 2014. 
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In summary one might say Cameron ignored what economists and others knew and told 
him, "It's the economy stupid!" Increasing the revenue streams needed to grow out of a 
recession come from the private sector economy and the consumption of taxpayers. To 
the extent that government budget cuts increase unemployment then revenues go down. 
And to the extent that investment and productivity in the private sector are affected neg-
atively by government budget cuts, revenues to government likewise go down. When 
revenues go down the deficit and debt of government go up, not down. The lessons of 
Cameron's folly should be studied widely, i.e., you cannot successfully cut your way out 
of an economic recession. Further, political ideology postulating success by cutting 
widely and deeply is preached by false prophets thrives by exploiting public fears which 
always accompany economic recession. From this example it would appear that politi-
cians advocating drastic spending cuts don't really care about solving the real problems 
presented by economic dips. Instead, they fan the flames of fear in pursuit of their own 
political fortunes by propagating and overstating the severity of fiscal and economic 
problems so as to stimulate increased debt panic that gives them the political leverage to 
cut back what they view of as the excesses of the welfare state. This perspective typical-
ly includes the belief in the US that we do not want to become a "socialist" welfare state 
like those in Europe, a perception that fails to meet the criterion of accuracy. The US 
already is so much like Europe that any perceived difference doesn't really matter, as 
explained by the late David Brooks years ago (Brooks, 2012). 
CONTRASTING THE US WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION IN MANAGEMENT 
OF FISCAL STRESS 
Extrapolating from the UK experience one wonders about the entire strategy of the Eu-
ropean Union leadership and the European Central Bank in its imposition of very harsh 
spending and public employment reduction requirements on Greece and additional 
members of the Eurozone that face fiscal stress or crisis, e.g., Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Belgium. We need to ask whether this fiscal policy approach is part of the 
solution or rather part of the problem in attempts to reverse the economic recession in 
Europe. An additional criticism of the EU approach is its monetary policy that has fea-
tured maintenance, over a considerable period of time after fiscal stress conditions 
arose, of comparatively high interest rates compared to the low interest rate strategy of 
the US. More recently the European Central Bank has moved closer towards the US 
approach by lowering interest rates and by pumping more than 1 trillion Euros into the 
Eurozone economy in two 3 year Long Term Financing Operation (LTRO) packages. 
However, the lowering of interest rates has stimulated criticism, particularly from the 
German Bundesbank and others who oppose further lowering of interest rates due to 
fears of inflation. In fact some critics are in favor of increasing rates with Germans ar-
guing that the time has come for the ECB to exit the "crisis-fighting mode" in managing 
European fiscal stress. 
To ground the consequences of the EU strategy in fact, the most recent projections on 
GDP for Europe indicate zero growth for this year and next year as well (Krugman, 
2012). It appears that Europe is headed into a second phase of serious economic reces-
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sion that the US has avoided by stimulating the economy rather than adopting measures 
that lead to economic retraction rather than growth. In addition, if we look at Sweden 
which did not impose such drastic government budget cuts we find the most successful 
nation in Europe in managing fiscal stress. Current GDP growth in Sweden exceeds not 
only all other nations in the Eurozone but most of the nations in the world that report 
GDP statistics, revenues and expenses honestly and accurately. 
Understanding fiscal stress and what to do about it requires in depth comprehension of 
the conditions in each individual nation facing such stress. For example, Italy has tradi-
tionally run very high levels of debt as a percentage of GDP so the critical question is 
how much more is harmful versus just more of the same, i.e., coping with continuous 
fiscal stress but coping none-the-less. Ireland may be in better shape that the other na-
tions in this set of fiscally stressed nations. In November 2010 it obtained a $89.5 bil-
lion line of credit with the European Union and International Monetary Fund and thus 
far has borrowed $63.5 billion from it at a rate of 3.3% (Associated Press, 2012a). 
While it seems likely that Ireland will not default on its debt and will be able to reenter 
the international market to sell its debt on the market in 2012, such debt must be sold 
offering higher rates of return for investors, e.g., 7% (as is the case at the time of this 
writing) which creates longer-term debt servicing problems and the need to commit 
more money to debt repayment at the expense of providing public services. 
The history of financial collapse in Europe is very long, and should provide lessons to 
the EU in attempting to manage fiscal stress and crisis. As noted by Peter Oborne, 
...the most important problem is the failure to study history. Here the facts are de-
vastating, and bear repetition. Portugal has defaulted on its national debt five 
times since 1800, Greece five times, Spain no less than seven times (and 13 times 
in all since 1500). The importance of these statistics is very great. They show that 
the widespread assumption by bureaucrats, senior politicians and commentators 
alike that eurozone countries could never go bankrupt is simply wrong. In fact, the 
opposite is the case. The normal and indeed the automatic response of Spain, Por-
tugal, Greece and many other European countries to major financial crises such as 
the one we are living through today has been to renege on their debts. So it would 
be extraordinary were they not to do so. History also shows that currency unions 
such as the eurozone invariably fail: the most relevant case in point is the Latin 
monetary union formed by France, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland in 1865, with 
Spain and Greece joining a few years later. Once again, these failures are invaria-
bly sparked by grand financial crises of the kind the world faces today Oborne, 
2012). 
The primary purpose in pointing out that each nation needs to be addressed individually 
rather with a "one size fits all" set of rules forced on fiscally troubled nations in Europe 
or elsewhere is that this is not the right approach. Solutions need to be and in reality are 
in fact tailored to the nature of the specific national economic context of individual na-
tions at the point where significant debt restructuring occurs. Unfortunately, the ECB, 
the Chancellor of Germany and others who support the one size fits all approach that 
characterizes the methodology adopted and implemented by Eurozone leadership ap-
pears to ignore this observation. In addition, critics point out what is easily recognizable 
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from a political viewpoint. Citizens of the wealthier nations of Europe really don't want 
to finance the bailout of the less prosperous nations in the Eurozone (Krugman, 2012). 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel has to walk a tightwire in trying to cope with Euro-
zone fiscal stress and crisis while still placating the voters who have kept her in office 
(Horn, 2012). And this is not just Merkel's problem. It is a problem of high importance 
and visibility related to the survival of the Euro as a currency for all of the Eurozone -- 
or alternatively survival of the Euro as the currency for only for some of the members. 
This is recognized by some nations that have prepared to join the Eurozone. Turkey for 
example, which has long pushed its own fiscal policy instrumentation to qualify for en-
try into the Eurozone, has had second thoughts and at present has halted most efforts to 
climb aboard what may be perceived as either a sinking ship or one that may be splitting 
apart, rich versus poor. Serbia also has implemented a number of initiatives to join the 
EU but now faces additional obstacles to entry based on new EU requirements. While it 
may remain attractive to Serbia to try to join the EU, resistance from citizens and politi-
cal parties in wealthier EU nations resulting from the current fiscal crisis may make it 
harder for Serbia and other nations to join the EU. The case for Serbia is made stronger 
because this nation has experienced recent GDP growth. 
It is interesting to note that some other nations wishing to join the EU have more to 
change in addition to what is required to meet EU regulations. Croatia for example is a 
small nation in which, due to its history, has a very large proportion of its GDP pro-
duced by the government itself, e.g., approximately 40%. Thus to gain entry to the EU 
Croatia would first need to privatize a substantial part of its product and service indus-
tries, not an easy task given that most of the populace prefers the traditional means of 
provision by the public sector and much of the nation's employment is composed of 
government workers. Further, in small nations like Croatia or Montenegro the govern-
ment cannot run high deficits because doing so would make it more costly in terms of 
interest offerings (and debt service costs) needed to sell its debt and, at some level of 
debt, impossible to borrow money from international investors. This creates a very real 
check on tendencies to run annual budget deficits that increase the size of the national 
debt. 
In face of this line of criticism, what has the EU done to manage fiscal stress most re-
cently and does it fit the previous "one size fits all" pattern? The answer is that recent 
measures mirror the approaches taken in the past. On March 2, 2012 the leaders of 
twenty-five European (EU) nations (out of the total of 27) signed a "treaty" (fiscal com-
pact) stipulating another one size fits all set of fiscal requirements that attempt to instill 
even greater fiscal discipline and austerity. It must be noted that the UK and the Czech 
Republic refused to sign this agreement. About this new initiative European Council 
President Herman Van Rompuy said, "It will bring...the economic and monetary union 
that is finally walking on two legs"(Associated Press, 2012b). This agreement is intend-
ed to further prevent a specific set of seventeen members of the EU from spending be-
yond their means, and to increase pressure for them to enforce tax increases and other 
austerity measures. 
The first problem with this approach is that it is more of the same; it does not differ in 
basic form from the single set rules and control-oriented approach that has proven unen-
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forceable and unsuccessful thus far in the EU, although the new criteria are intentionally 
slightly less rigorous in this edict than in those that preceded it. However, other prob-
lems with this new initiative are more serious. Because all EU members did not sign it, 
this creates the need for a separate "treaty" to be negotiated for the two dissenting na-
tions rather than integrating the new rules into EU law. This, in turn, prevents the Euro-
pean Commission (the EU's executive body) from forcing the new requirements across 
the entire EU. To bring the new rules into effect requires participating nations to ap-
prove it individually by either legislative or popular vote. If 12 of the 17 affected na-
tions approve it by a majority vote then it will go into effect. Whether this will happen 
and how long it will take, even if it is successful, is unknown. Two public referenda 
votes in Ireland over similar initiatives failed to receive approval. 
What is known is that the leaders of EU nations and the public in those nations affected 
by the austerity measures (and all of Europe for that matter) are growing increasingly 
weary of the effects of economic recession, accompanying high unemployment rates, 
etc. and are losing confidence in the EU's use of what many perceive as "German style" 
fiscal discipline. Likewise, wealthier EU nations are getting tired of supporting poorer 
nations, which is understandable given that one wave of loans, debt payback time exten-
sions and debt forgiveness follows another. This brings confidence in the EU (and the 
Euro as a common currency) even lower. Most notably it creates a common ground of 
mistrust wherein neither those nations providing assistance nor those receiving it find it 
easy to sustain confidence in EU fiscal stress management capability. If and when indi-
vidual governments in the region that have supported EU are austerity initiatives are 
voted out of office, the stability of the EU and the Euro will face an even great chal-
lenge (Associated Press, 2012b). 
From my perspective, the overall problem with the EU's approach, as noted, is that it 
will retard economic growth that is needed to increase revenues sufficient for the region 
to crawl out of economic recession. In fact, it will likely have just the opposite effect; it 
will make the overall economic stagnation in Europe worse rather than better. 
WHAT ABOUT GREECE? 
For some of the poorer, heavily debt ridden nations in the Eurozone, the word crisis is 
an apt description of their economic and fiscal condition. The nation receiving the 
greatest attention is Greece, which is in the midst of major debt restructuring and al-
ready is in partial default on its debt. It is paying off older debt as it comes due with 
newly acquired debt ("rolling it up" in banking terms). Greece also has been supported 
by EU sponsored "bond swaps" of 107 billion Euros ($144 billion), a primary means of 
defeasing debt, and is currently asking some bank lenders to accept debt repayment at 
50% of what is owed (more defeasance). Greece also is attempting to generate new rev-
enues through privatization of government enterprises (e.g., its Public Gas Corporation) 
and sale or leasing of valuable public assets. Greece has received EU and IMF rescue 
loans in waves since May 2010. The first such set of loans in 2010 provided 73 billion 
Euros which was then followed by a 130 Euro billion ($172 billion) loan package. The 
problem with this series of bailouts is, bluntly, that they haven't succeeded in doing any-
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thing beyond delaying the nation's default. At the end of the first week of March, 2012 
credit rating agencies downgraded Greek bonds to the lowest levels in their rating sys-
tems, noting that investors holding existing bond were set to receive repayments 
through bond swaps at 53.5% of their nominal value, with actual losses to investors es-
timated at approximately 74% (Moody's, 2012). 
It seems very likely that Greece will eventually go bankrupt (i.e., into complete default) 
regardless of the continuing lending initiatives of the EU and European Central Bank, 
the International Monetary Bank, the Government of China and others. The issue prob-
ably isn't whether but when this will occur and for whom it matters most. The short an-
swer is it matters most to holders of Greek debt, e.g., Western European banks includ-
ing selected banks in France. The larger question is what difference this will make in 
terms of the stability of the EU, the Euro and European stock markets? 
In this last regard we can note the apparent irrationality of stock markets. In the begin-
ning of March 2012 the Finance Ministry of Greece reported that despite (or perhaps 
because of) government austerity measures in place since late 2010, the nation had rec-
orded a deficit of $652 million for the month of January in contrast to a surplus for the 
same period in 2011 (Associated Press, 2012b). In response to this report from Greece, 
and then after a new loan package agreement was approved by the EU in mid-March 
2012, European stock markets dropped but not by as much as anticipated. Perhaps in-
vestors believe in miracles or maybe they are playing it risky, continuing to reap short-
term gains as stock markets fluctuate up and down, with the intention of pulling out 
once a Greek default appears imminent? In addition, there is considerable bond specula-
tion intended to make a profit if Greece defaults. 
How much will a default by Greece matter to the US stock market? While all of this is 
merely speculation, we may assume that stock market investment is motivated by two 
primary factors, (a) an understandable desire for profit, and (b) the fear of loss, with the 
latter the most important behavioral driver in the circumstance of fiscal crisis. So, as 
Greece defaults partially on its debt and if it defaults entirely after the next elections that 
bring in a new prime minister as a result of a change in the balance of seats in their coa-
lition government, the European stock market will be hit hardest. In the US one might 
anticipate there could be some decline in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and 
other US market indices. However, after initial reaction out of fear, investors in the US 
stock market will likely become more rational and ask, "How does this really affect the 
stocks in our market? Interest rates are a key element here. If the Federal Reserve Bank 
keeps interest rates low, once investors in US stock markets become more "rational" 
they are likely to see some good buying opportunities and dive back into the market so 
that within a relatively short period of time the market will climb back up to a DJIA of 
about 13,000 and over time probably higher. Why? Because the US is recovering from 
the recession much more rapidly that the Eurozone or the UK for that matter. Once in-
vestors look more carefully at projected positive US GDP growth in the period 2012 - 
2014, then getting back into the market is likely to appear to be more attractive. I make 
no claim to wisdom regarding stock markets - and I don't gamble big in Las Vegas or 
elsewhere either. I say this not as a joke but rather as a sincere assessment that investing 
in stocks during periods of economic and fiscal instability is akin to casino gambling 
  L. R. Jones 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 13, Iss. 1, 2012 
 www.ipmr.net  15 IPMR
and I choose to err on the safe side. Still, we all realize that financial risk preferences 
differ by individual investor, investment bank and other institutions. Further, stock mar-
ket volatility is profitable to some participants including day trading investors who 
guess right and buy and sell at the appropriate times, and to the bond dealers who make 
money based on buy and sell transactions. One other observation may be made about 
fiscal stress and crisis: the media have an incentive to use the word crisis whenever pos-
sible to attract the attention of their consumers. Crisis is a much more powerful word 
than mere stress. Thus, media bias in this respect is predictable, and this influences in-
vestor confidence. 
What is explained above with respect to Greece shouldn't surprise anyone who has 
watched other European nations that already have gone into default or have move ever 
more closely towards it while restructuring their debt. Greece has drawn international 
attention because of the degree of opposition of a sizable part of the Greek populace to 
the spending restraint measures forced by the EU and the fact that not much has been 
written about the default of Iceland (2008), or partial defaults of Hungary, Romania and 
other nations in this area of the world. A number of European nations are in fact on the 
brink of default and are deeply involved in debt workouts that have become a normal 
facet of international public sector finance over the past decade or so, e.g., the success-
ful debt workout solution to the Argentina default in 1999 and 2000. However, the con-
dition of the world economy was in far better position then than it is now for lenders to 
provide financial assistance, particularly for the US which contributed debt supporting 
bond coverage to finance part of the Argentine bailout. 
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC 
RECOVERY 
In present circumstance the US faces continuous threat from militants and terrorists 
around the globe and remains engaged in an active shooting war in Afghanistan. It re-
mains a challenge to President Obama, the Department of Defense and Congress to sus-
tain support for war and anti-terrorism funding more generally during a period in which 
the American public has become tired of and increasingly more disapproving of the war 
in Afghanistan. Recent public opinion polls show significantly diminished support by 
the American public for this war. Given this fact, how long can we expect the President 
to propose and Congress to continue to appropriate funding to sustain this war effort 
and all that it involves? 
Members of Congress have to respond in some way to public opinion to get reelected, 
as does the President. The January 2012 US announcement of an earlier date for cessa-
tion of armed conflict in Afghanistan and accelerated troop withdrawal reflect the 
Obama administration's awareness of public discontent with the war and war spending. 
This is particularly when polls show that the mood of the public has changed to support 
funding for programs to create jobs, rebuild America's aging public works infrastruc-
ture, address the very serious issues of increasing poverty and the weakness of the na-
tion's public education system. The reality is that any nation that neglects the long-term 
education of its populace, and under-invests in support of those things that regrettably 
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have come to be taken for granted including public safety, a clean environment, well 
maintained highways and transportation systems, financing to enable home ownership, 
and the benefits of application of better low and high technology -- all those things that 
have supported a fast fading lifestyle for a vast but shrinking US middle income class -- 
will create the conditions of its own economic demise in an increasingly competitive 
international economic marketplace. However, it is important not to lose sight of the 
fact that economic recovery and growth depend on the security of nations to engage in 
international commerce. Recent events related to continuing tensions between Iran and 
Israel and concerns about Iran's nuclear weapon intentions demonstrate how quickly 
markets and commerce can be affected by quickly emergent security threats, in this case 
of the type that increase the price of oil and its derivatives including gasoline. Given 
that such threats to the national security of the US, Europe and other regions of the 
world are present and the fact that threats posed by terrorists are increasing rather that 
diminishing, it is imperative to consider the consequences of precisely how spending on 
national security is reduced. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It may be helpful during this period of global economic stress to recall the words of a 
newly elected President Franklin D. Roosevelt in his first inaugural address delivered in 
March, 1933, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself” (Rosenman, 1938).While 
Roosevelt was right, it took a long time for financial markets and economic conditions 
to improve after he delivered this statement, and the consequences of the global eco-
nomic depression of the 1930s changed the world in ways that few at the time anticipat-
ed. From a national security perspective the global financial stress of the 1930s contrib-
uted to the rise of the Third Reich in Germany and led to the events that started World 
War II. For this reason US and policy makers in other nations need to think beyond the 
purely domestic economic effects of budget reduction as the only element of strategy to 
manage fiscal stress and crisis. 
Now let us review some of the major conclusions drawn from this study, as follows: 
1. Debt panic is motivated by political incentives and not current debt and fiscal reality. 
This is to be expected in a general election year. Current initiatives proposed in the US 
Congress to date to cut the annual deficit and national debt appear to be driven more by 
political positioning/posturing than they are by immediate fiscal crisis imperatives. This 
explains in part why some members of Congress claim that the need to cut discretionary 
spending is urgent when doing so will have little real impact on reducing national in-
debtedness. In fact, rapid cuts are likely to weaken the economy and reduce revenues so 
as to make the problem worse rather than better. Further, the bottom line is that the 
problem of the annual deficits and cumulative debt are not yet at the point of crisis de-
spite what those campaigning for office or the media report. However, as noted, the 
long-term solvency of the US is at risk and the development of well reasoned approach-
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es to matching revenues to spending is imperative. The conclusions of this research pro-
ject indicate that actions to address long-term solvency need to be very carefully con-
structed, analyzed thoroughly and negotiated using care to resist political incentives to 
act quickly out of fear and in debt panic. Actions taken in panic typically lead to disas-
ter. We have time to do what is needed but the rush towards "quick fixes" should be 
avoided because the risks of getting it wrong are too high. 
2. The size of annual deficits and long-term debt are significant problems that need to be 
resolved, and sooner is better than later in this regard. Trust fund solvency is of utmost 
importance because such debt contributes mightily to annual deficits and total debt. For 
example, since 2009-2010 the Social Security Trust Fund has been spending more that 
it receives in income, which adds to the federal government debt, whether we count 
such debt as "on-budget" or "off-budget". Debt is debt and must be addressed as such. 
However, the apparent significance of the deficit and debt problems depends to a great 
extent on how deficits and debt are measured, e.g., whether Social Security is included, 
and against what base deficits and debt are measured. Thus, when current US debt is 
compared to that of other developed nations it is evident that there is no cause to panic 
in part because the US economy is recovering from recession relatively well and better 
times probably are in sight. Still, the number of citizens qualifying for entitlement pay-
ments of various types increases every day. 
3. Real solutions to reduce annual deficits and long-term federal debt must include at 
least three components: a) increasing revenues through reform of both general and spe-
cial tax incidences and rates, b) holding discretionary spending at roughly the rate of 
inflation, c) modifications to current policies to reduce entitlement spending growth and 
introduction of methods to increase revenues for federal trust funds and entitlement 
programs, e.g., Social Security and Medicare/Medicaid. This claim follows the logic of 
experts in the field (e.g., Bowles-Simpson Report, 2010; Peterson Foundation, 2011; 
Bipartisan Policy Center, 2012). The most pressing problem for the US is deciding how 
to control fast rising health care costs as the population ages and as the costs of new and 
better medical technologies that everyone wants to use increase. 
4. The fiscal and financial situation in the Eurozone is presently quite bleak, as is the 
case in the United Kingdom, particularly concerning Greece and a select number of oth-
er fiscally troubled EU nations. Greece is in fact in fiscal crisis using the definitions 
developed in this article. The only loans Greece can get are from the EU and IMF. 
Greece is paying off debt to bank lenders at roughly 50% of what is owed and investing 
banks and other institutions are taking almost 75% losses on their investments in 
Greece. This constitutes default by any definition. As defined in this article, during fis-
cal stress conditions nations and other entities can still sell their debt or get loans. How-
ever, fiscal crisis is defined as the point when a nation cannot any longer finance itself 
through borrowing because no investors will buy their debt instruments regardless of 
the interest rates offered. Crises are made worse when external agents, particularly the 
EU and European Central Bank, the IMF and other large scale participants in debt re-
structuring impose spending and employment reductions that cannot realistically be 
achieved. Further, the application of the same "one size fits all" debt resolution rules 
and requirements such as those currently applied by the EU damage the economies of 
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nations upon which austerity rules are imposed to the point that economic recovery be-
comes virtually impossible within any short period of time. In cases such as Greece it 
will take many years to recover from the depth of their fiscal problems that have been 
brought on over a long period of time by weak or no tax law enforcement, overly gener-
ous qualifications for benefits that are too easily met and are not in alignment with poli-
cies and practices in other nations in the Eurozone or elsewhere. 
5. The problem of no GDP growth in the UK is largely a result of the misguided poli-
cies of PM David Cameron and the platform of ideology represented by his govern-
ment. Deep cuts to government agency budgets that reduce employment quickly and 
substantially as a means of managing fiscal stress do just the opposite of what they in-
tend. They weaken the economy so that revenue flows to the government drop and the 
size of the deficit actually reduced by budget cutting is virtually irrelevant compared to 
the revenue losses when the economy stalls. This is not to mention the sacrifices forced 
onto consumers of UK public services. Cameron's folly has made economic recovery 
from recession in the UK a much more problematic and longer-term matter. 
6. Finally, despite all the attention generated by politicians, amplified beyond all recog-
nition by the media, government actions to control spending seldom succeed as an-
nounced. In reality most governments do less than they promise to balance annual bud-
gets and reduce total debt because political incentives encourage increased spending 
rather than cutting it (Wildavsky and Jones, 1994). Rather, government deficits and debt 
are reduced by increases in production and productivity in the private sector and by in-
creased consumer confidence, spending and consumption. Having arrived at this con-
clusion however does not relieve fiscally beleaguered nations from the necessity to int-
roduce more effective restraint over spending in entitlement programs that will, if not 
adjusted over the long-run, bankrupt the US and any other nation that ignores this impe-
rative. Yet cost control alone is not enough. While it is economically rational to want to 
be a "free rider" and to consume services without paying for them, or paying far less 
than the full price for what is consumed or provided by government, is a way of life that 
is unsustainable. This is true in Greece, throughout the Eurozone and in the US where 
citizen resistance to tax and other means of increasing government revenues is some-
thing akin to a cultural moray or folkway. Now it is time to pay the piper.
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